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California v. Greenwood: A Proposed
Compromise to the Exploitation of the
Objective Expectation of Privacy*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court for the first time heard a case which determines
whether an individual has Fourth Amendment protections against the
search and seizure of garbage that has been placed outside the curtilage'
for collection.2 The Court in California v. Greenwood,3 applying the
Fourth Amendment test established in Katz v. United States,4 determined
that Greenwood manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in his gar-
bage.' Despite Greenwood's expectation of privacy, the Court declared
* Thanks to Professor George Kannar for his valuable suggestions, encouragement and
guidance on early drafts, and to Ginger D. Schroder for her diligent work on the notes!
1. The curtilage theory was developed out of the early trespass doctrine, it extended Fourth
Amendment privacy protections to the inner private areas of property. These areas traditionally
included the house and immediate yard. The theory was derived from the trespass concepts of Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See infra text accompanying notes 57-64 for the historical
development of the property concept as applied to Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases.
2. Although the Supreme Court had not heard a case which determined whether there was a
right to privacy in garbage until 1988, a large number of decisions have been rendered in lower
courts which established a diverse interpretation of the privacy interests in garbage. See State v.
Stevens, 123 Wis.2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985) (there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage which has been placed upon the curb for collection); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486
P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971) (marijuana obtained from the warrantless search of trash placed
upon the curb for collection is inadmissible as evidence, as defendant manifested a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his trash); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978) (unless an
individual makes special arrangements for the disposition of trash placed upon the curb for collec-
tion, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash and no Fourth Amendment protec-
tions); and United States v. Vahalik 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1979) (absent special arrangements for the
disposition of trash or municipal ordinances which prohibit the tampering of trash, the Fourth
Amendment rights of the defendant are not violated by the warrantless search of the trash).
3. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In 1967 the Supreme Court adopted a reasonable
expectation of privacy standard for determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment. This standard
set aside the property guided test established in Hester, 265 U.S. at 57. Justice Harlan suggested in
his Katz concurrence that the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy be measured by requiring
both a subjective (on behalf of the individual) and objective (on behalf of society) expectation of
privacy Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). This two-part test was later adopted in
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The subjective-objective standard is now the applicable
standard in interpretations of the scope of the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 69 for the relevant
facts of Katz.
5. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39.
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that the objective expectation of privacy in garbage was not accepted by
society and therefore the contents of trash left on the curb was not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment.6 The Court, remaining consistent with
recent judicial decisions,7 broadened the investigative powers of law en-
forcement officials at the expense of individual protections provided by
the Fourth Amendment.'
The application of the Katz test in Greenwood required the Court to
make a determination that society does not have an objective expectation
of privacy in garbage which has been placed on the curb for collection.
This manipulation of the societal views of privacy in garbage has been
the standard judicial reply in many lower court rulings, which square the
search and seizure of evidence from garbage with individual Fourth
Amendment protections, 9 and is now affirmed by the Supreme Court.' 0
Alternatively, if the Court conceded there is a reasonable societal
expectation of privacy in garbage and reasoned that the degree of privacy
expected by society varies with the area of concern,I l it would have been
possible to adopt a less stringent standard as a threshold test for constitu-
6. Id.
7. See, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (law enforcement officials may violate the individ-
ual's expectation of privacy in one's self, by initiating a stop and frisk, when it is determined that the
safety of the officer is in question); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (The warrant require-
ment for the search of an automobile, subsequent to the arrest of the defendant, is waived when
probable cause is established).
8. Kitch, Katz v. United States" The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. Cr. REv. 133
(1968) (The inherent ambiguity of the Katz decision allows the Court to manipulate the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment in pursuit of policy objectives). See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
Using the substantial leeway provided by the Katz decision the Court has in numerous instances
expanded the police power to search at the expense of the Fourth Amendment. This is accomplished
by simply declaring that society does not accept an expectation of privacy in a given area, as
reasonable.
9. See, eg., Stevens, 123 Wis.2d at 303, 367 N.W.2d at 788; Crowell,, 586 F.2d at 1020. A
plurality of lower court decisions have relied upon a relinquishment of privacy rights in garbage
based upon a lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy on the behalf of the individual or a rejection
of the expectation of privacy by society. Many of these courts have avoided answering the question
whether society accepts the expectation of privacy in garbage as reasonable by simply declaring that
the defendant had not manifested an expectation of privacy in garbage. For example, in Crowell, 586
F.2d at 1020, the court declared that Crowell did not demonstrate his expectation of privacy in
garbage since he had not hired a private carrier to dispose of his trash. A minority of lower courts
have ruled the expectation of privacy in garbage as unreasonable based upon the societal rejection of
privacy rights in garbage. See, eg., Stevens, 123 Wis.2d at 303, 367 N.W.2d at 788. The conflicting
interpretations of the individual's and society's expectation of privacy in trash would indicate that
perhaps the line between the two is not decipherable.
10. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35.
11. The level of sanctity expected in a given area of concern varies greatly with each specific
area. For example, the level of sanctity expected in the home is greater than the level expected in the
car. It is generally recognized that the level of sanctity expected in the home is paramount to all
GREENWOOD
tional searches of garbage.12 Serious consideration should be given to the
application of an intermediate standard that will allow police to make
reasonable searches of garbage without infringing upon the constitutional
rights of privacy of innocent parties. 13
This comment will be divided into four sections to facilitate an un-
derstanding of the logic in applying a sliding scale standard of probable
cause in garbage search and seizure cases such as Greenwood. The first
section will provide a concise analysis of both the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Greenwood decision. The analysis of Greenwood will
demonstrate how the Supreme Court majority has misinterpreted the so-
cietal acceptance of an objective expectation of privacy in garbage.
This section will be followed by an analysis of the development and
application of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine to war-
rantless trash searches. The application of the Katz subjective-objective
test by the lower courts has been inconsistent and confused, and will be
examined in detail in section two.
The third section will demonstrate that there is an objective expecta-
tion of privacy in garbage which society readily accepts as well as a sub-
jective expectation of privacy on the part of individuals. This societal
acceptance of a right to privacy in garbage will be demonstrated by ex-
amining the information which is revealed in a warrantless trash search
and illustrating the manner in which the members of our society have
disposed of refuse in an attempt to preserve these privacies. This section
will also discuss the potential consequences of the Greenwood decision
and why society is not prepared to accept such consequences.
The final section will reason that if these objective and subjective
other areas. N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43-50 (1970).
12. The probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment have been relaxed by the Court
on many occasions. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Carroll,, 267 U.S. 132 (the Court relaxes the warrant
requirement for automobile searches). The Court has circumvented well established Constitutional
requirements in the interest of law enforcement and the public good. It is important to recognize the
difference between relaxing the requirements for obtaining a warrant and relaxing the requirements
of having a warrant. It is my contention throughout this note, that the requirement of having a
warrant should only be relaxed in exceptional cases. However, the requirements needed to obtain a
warrant should reflect the flexibility that is mandated by a varying expectation of privacy in a given
area.
13. A sliding scale probable cause standard would provide a standard which is less stringent
than the current probable cause standard. If this sliding scale probable cause standard were applied
by the courts in an areas which qualify for Fourth Amendment protections, because of an expecta-
tion of privacy, the individual rights would be adequately protected. A theory similar to the one
employed in administrative cases, would provide a judicially enforceable standard. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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rights of privacy are accepted, a logical solution would have been the
implementation of a flexible, sliding scale standard of probable cause.' 4
This final section will attempt to demonstrate that the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is not a rigid, inflexible, doctrinal
declaration; rather, it is a malleable instrument capable of being molded
to safeguard the degree of privacy in an area which society expects to be
protected. In conclusion, the probable cause standard should be adjusted
to reflect the level of privacy expected in a given area; this would allow
the issuance of a warrant with a flexible amount of evidence of a crime.
II. ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD
A. Statement of Facts
In February of 1984, the Laguna Beach Police were notified by the
Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that an arrested suspect in
Nevada informed DEA agents of a large shipment of drugs, in a U-Haul
truck, enroute to the home of Billy Greenwood."5 Following the receipt
of this information, the police received complaints from Greenwood's
neighbors that the traffic at his home was abnormally heavy late in the
evening. Additionally, the traffic was indicative of drug traffic as the vis-
its to Greenwood's home were usually not longer than ten minutes in
duration.1 6
Late in February, the police received information from Green-
wood's neighbor that a U-haul truck had been parked outside of Green-
wood's home for a period of four days, and that a Jartan truck was
currently located in front of his home. 17 Acting on this information the
police, with the assistance of dogs trained in the detection of narcotic
substances, searched the location surrounding Greenwood's home for
drugs. The canine search came up empty; however, shortly after the
search the police followed the Jartan truck to the residence of a previ-
ously investigated drug trafficker. 8
Based upon the suspicious nature of these events, the police began a
warrantless trash surveillance of Greenwood. Every week for two months
14. A flexible, sliding scale standard of probable cause is a term designated to a probable cause
standard which is either heightened or lessened to reflect the societal expectation of privacy. See
infra p. 667-670 and accompanying notes.
15. California v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App.3d 729, 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1986), rev'd,
486 U.S. 35 (1988).
16. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37.
17. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App.3d at 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
18. Id.
[Vol. 38
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the police had the trash collector turn over to them the trash which was
collected from the curb in front of Greenwood's home. 19 The police care-
fully sifted through the contents of Greenwood's opaquez° trash bags
where they ultimately found "evidence of drug trafficking."
2 1
With the evidence obtained from the warrantless trash search, the
police were able to obtain a warrant to search the home of Greenwood. 2
In the course of the search, the police located quantities of cocaine and
hashish, and subsequently arrested Greenwood and co-defendant Diane
Van Houten."3 Both Greenwood and Van Houten posted bail and were
released.24
Early in May, the police again received information that there was
abnormally heavy traffic at Greenwood's home. A subsequent warrant-
less trash search of Greenwood's refuse,25 again revealed "evidence of
drug trafficking."'26 A second warrant to search Greenwood's home was
obtained with this evidence and executed. This second search again re-
vealed narcotics and drug trafficking paraphernalia which led to the sec-
ond arrest of Greenwood and Van Houten.27
In the course of Greenwood's .and Van Houten's trial in the Supe-
rior Court of Orange County the defendants moved to suppress the evi-
dence obtained subsequent to the search of the garbage.28 Judge Carter
granted defendants' motion based upon the California Supreme Court
holding in People v. Krivda.29 The prosecution appealed to the California
19. Greenwood 486 U.S. 35, 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. The fact that the trash bag is opaque was significant in that it demonstrates Greenwood's
subjective expectation of privacy in the trash bag. This can be taken one step further and demon-
strate that since opaque, as opposed to transparent, bags are desired by consumers; this affirms the
societal preference for privacy in garbage. See infra p. 663 and accompanying notes.
21. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App.3d at 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
22. Id.
23. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 38.
24. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App.3d at 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
25. Nowhere in the Greenwood opinion and litigation briefs, has it been mentioned that in the
second series of searches, that Greenwood's subjective expectation of privacy in his garbage may
have changed. In the first search he legitimately had an expectation of privacy in garbage. Did this
change in the subsequent search? After all, he knew the police were rummaging through his gar-
bage. Perhaps this is insignificant, but it seems odd that this quandary was never reached by either
side.
26. Id.
27. In each the first and second arrests, the police made the determination that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish probable cause and used the warrantless trash searches as vehicles in
which to gather enough evidence to meet the probable cause standard. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App.3d
at 733-734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 540-541.
28. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 28.
29. The California Supreme Court in Krivda, 5 Cal.3d at 357, 486 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr.
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Court of Appeals, which affirmed the superior court decision based upon
the precedent established in Krivda.30 The Supreme Court of California
denied the prosecution's petition for review."
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and re-
versed the California Court of Appeals. The Court declared that
although an individual has an expectation of privacy in garbage, society
is not prepared to accept this expectation as reasonable.3 2
B. Majority Opinion
On May 16, 1988, Justice White delivered the California v. Green-
wood opinion." The Court declared, using the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard first applied in Katz,34 that garbage placed upon the
curb for collection does not qualify for the privacy protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
The Court stated in Greenwood, "[t]he warrantless search and
seizure of the garbage bags left outside the Greenwood house would vio-
late the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective
expectation of privaly in their garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable."36 In this dictum, the Court has reaffirmed its allegiance to
extending Fourth Amendment protections only as far as society deems
acceptable.
In applying the Katz test in Greenwood, the Court conceded that
Greenwood demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in his gar-
bage; declaring, "[i]t may well be that respondents did not expect that
the contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police or
other members of the public."37 The Court reasoned that because Green-
wood placed his trash in opaque plastic bags which would only be on the
62, used the reasonable expectation of privacy standard established in Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 and
affirmed in United States -v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), determining that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in garbage. In the Krivda opinion, Justice Burke has sent a strong signal to all
lower California courts that this is the appropriate interpretation of Katz when applied to warrant-
less trash searches, and not the positions of various federal courts. "We need not adopt the position
of the Second Circuit that trash placed at curb side for pickup may be characterized as 'abandoned'."
Krivda 5 Cal.App.3d at 369, 486 P.2d at 1270, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 72, citing United States v. Dzialak,
441 F.2d 212 (2nd Cir. 1971) (trash on the sidewalk is abandoned).
30. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App.3d at 733-735, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.
31. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39.
32. Id. at 3941,
33. Id. at 35.
34. See supm note4-and accompanying text.
35. Greenwood, 486 U.S.'at 40-1.
36. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39.
37. Id.
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street for a fixed period of time before being mixed with other people's
garbage, Greenwood had established his subjective expectation of
privacy. 8
According to the Katz standard, as applied by the Court, any subjec-
tive expectation of privacy must also be accepted by society as objectively
reasonable. 39 The Greenwood Court held that "[a]n expectation of pri-
vacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protections, however, un-
less society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively
reasonable."'  The Court in Greenwood declared that society is not pre-
pared to accept an expectation of privacy in garbage as objectively rea-
sonable because garbage left on the curb is readily accessible to many
members of our society.41 "Accordingly, having deposited the garbage 'in
an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of
speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having stran-
gers take it,' respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded. ''42 The Court rein-
forced its conclusion that society. is not prepared to accept as reasonable
an expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb by providing a
lengthy list of federal and state cases which allowed the admittance of
evidence obtained via warrantless searches of garbage.43
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justices Brennan and Marshall voiced a scowling dissent in Green-
wood, expressing the opinion that individuals have a protected expecta-
38. Id. Are the expectations of other members of society different than those of Mr. Green-
wood? At some point a widespread individual expectation of privacy must be demonstrative of the
societal expectations. See infra p. 662 and accompanying notes.
39. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39. See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
40. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 39-40.
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id. at 40-41, citing United States v Reicherter, 647 F.2d. 397, 399 (3rd Cir. 1981) (when
police officers dress like trash collectors and collect refuse without a search warrant, there is no
violation of the defendants Fourth Amendment rights to privacy).
43. Justice White has provided an exhaustive list of lower federal and state opinions which have
allowed the admission of evidence which was received via a warrantless trash search. See Greenwood,
486 U.S. at 41-43. Justice White has attempted to draw a correlation between lower court interpreta-
tions of privacy and actual societal expectations of privacy. If there were such a correlation between
the two, there exist an ample number of lower court cases which suggest that there is a societal
expectation of privacy in garbage. See eg., People v. Krivda, 5 Cal.3d 357, 486 P.2d 1267, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1971); Ball v. State, 57 Wis.2d 653, 205 N.W.2d 353 (1973) (evidence found in a burn-
barrel is not abandoned and therefore not admissible if obtained without a warrant). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court rarely relies upon the legal determinations of lower courts when deciding the
viability of a contested legal matter before them.
1990]
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tion of privacy in any sealed, nontransparent package. The dissent also
applied the Katz doctrine, adverse to the majority holding, finding the
surveillance of another's trash to be contrary to notions of civilized
behavior."
Justice Brennan reasoned that any package which is opaque and
sealed satisfies the expectation of privacy test, even if the package is not
in the possession of the individual. "[S]o long as a package is 'closed
against inspection,' the Fourth Amendment protects its contents, 'wher-
ever they may be,' and the police must obtain a warrant to search
it... .,4 In the opinion of Justice Brennan, as long as the content of any
package is not in the plain view of the police officer, the content of the
package is protected by the Fourth Amendment."
In applying the Katz test to the warrantless search and seizure of
garbage, Justice Brennan was of the opinion that society is willing to
accept the objective expectation of privacy as reasonable. "Scrutiny of
another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized be-
havior. I suspect, therefore, that members of our society will be
shocked...
Justice Brennan reasoned that society is prepared to accept the ob-
jective right to privacy in garbage, because a garbage bag, like many
sealed containers, holds many of the personal effects which reveal inti-
mate activities of individuals.48 Many, if not all, of the personal details of
a person's life can be ascertained from the search of trash. "It cannot be
doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of the 'intimate
activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and his privacies of
life' which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect. 4 9
Both the majority and dissent based their opinions around the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test as derived from Katz.50 Unfortu-
nately, the niajority is guided by a strict adherence to its ideology. If a
strict adherence to the Katz doctrine had been followed, and the Court
recognized tie contemporary societal attitude toward privacy in general,
the domainl of garbage placed upon the curb for collection would have
been a constitutionally protected area. A thorough analysis of the Katz
44. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 45-56.
45. Id. at 46, citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877), accord United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 279 (1970).
46. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 45-46.
48. Id. at 50-51.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 41, 54.
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doctrine in the context of warrantless garbage searches, when viewed
with societal expectations of privacy, will demonstrate the majority's
misinterpretation of societal views in Greenwood."1
III. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE KATZ EXPECTATION
OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE TO WARRANTLESS TRASH
SEARCHES
Traditionally, police have used various warrantless methods in ob-
taining evidence of criminal activity. 2 Inevitably these methods are chal-
lenged by individuals based upon a violation of the rights of privacy as
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. 3 The courts have been forced to
develop tests which square the privacy rights of individuals with the in-
vestigative authority of the law enforcement agencies.5 4
Prior to the landmark5 decision of Katz, 6 the courts relied upon
the trespass doctrine established in Hester v. United States to establish
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The Court in Hester reasoned
there is a common law distinction between the house and the "open
fields."5" The protections of the Fourth-Amendment were not extended
51. See, eg., Bush, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash Reconnaissance in
Katz v. United States, 23 ARMZ. L. REV. 283 (1983). Bush provides a thorough analysis of both the
subjective and objective expectations of privacy in the context of the Katz decision.
52. For an interesting look at various police tactics employed throughout the United States, see
Marx, Undercover Cops: Creative Policing or Constitutional Threat?, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 34 (Jul.-Aug.
1977).
53. See, eg., Bush, supra note 51, at 283. See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (the
warrantless airplane surveillance of defendants fenced in back yard was challenged as a violation of
Fourth Amendment privacy rights); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1983) (the evidence
seized during the warrantless foot patrol of an enclosed field labeled with no trespassing signs was
challenged on Fourth Amendment privacy grounds).
54. Throughout U.S. judicial history, the courts have constructed theories to provide guidance
to law enforcement officials, and in many instances expand their authority. See, eg., Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
55. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 383 (1974) ("I
have taken the time to rehearse the background and the grounds of decision of the Katz case in order
to emphasize its extraordinary character and implications. The case is, of course, now generally
recognized as seminal and has rapidly become the basis of a new formula of fourth amendment
coverage").
56. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
57. See Hester, 265 U.S. at 57 (Hester was observed by law enforcement officials who were
concealed in the open fields near his home. During the course of the surveillance it was observed that
Hester was indulging himself in the spoils of an illegal liquor trade. Hester has challenged this war-
rantless surveillance on Fourth Amendment grounds). The Hester curtilage theory extends Fourth
Amendment protections to the actual house and the area which is commonly considered the yard.
The protections are not extended to the fields and woods which may surround a house. Id.
58. Id. at 59.
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beyond the boundaries immediately surrounding the home. Any evidence
seized outside the curtilage5 9 was not the product of a physical trespass
within the constitutionally protected area of the home and, therefore,
was admissible.60 Until the decision in Katz, the Hester "open field" doc-
trine was routinely applied by lower courts61 in determining the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections.
In 1967 the Supreme Court established the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine in Katz which nullified the trespass doctrine established
in Hester.62 The Court stated, "the 'trespass' doctrine... can no longer be
regarded as controlling." 63 The "trespass" doctrine, since its inception,
has protected physical property; however, the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect the rights of the individual. The Court concluded:
"and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-
and not simply "areas" against unreasonable searches and seizures it be-
comes clear that the reach of the amendment cannot turn upon the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 64
In an attempt to expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment, in
order to protect the rights of individuals, the Court adopted the reason-
able expectation of privacy doctrine. This standard would, at least in the-
ory, be responsive to the desires of both society and individuals. The
majority in Katz held that the expectation of privacy simply must be
reasonable.6
59. Id. at 57-59.
60. Id. at 58-59.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Cambel, 395 F.2d. 848 (4th Cir. 1968) (government agents were
not within the curtilage of Cambel's home, when the surveillance took place from a corn field adja-
cent to his home); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d. 310 (1st Cir. 1966) (Treasury agents
violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when they searched a barn on defendant's property;
the barn was within the curtilage of the home); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(warrantless interceptions of defendants telephone transmissions were not a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy, because there was not a trespass into the curtilage of Olmstead's
home); Waltenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968) (the search and seizure of 1000
stolen, red fur Christmas-trees in a lot immediately adjacent to defendants home violates the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights as this is an intrusion within the curtilage of the home),
62. The defendant in Katz was transmitting illegal gambling information over state lines, when
his end of the conversation was recorded by FBI agents. The agents had attached a sophisticated
listening device to the exterior of the telephone booth from which the defendant was making the
calls. Katz appealed his conviction based upon a violation of his Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
The lower courts have ruled that because there was no physical trespass into the curtilage of Katz's
home, there was no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347-361. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text for the judicial standard applied by the Court.
63. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
64. Id. at 353.
65. Id. at 35. In the late 1960's there was a vocal public outcry for protection of individual
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To clarify exactly what is a reasonable expectation of privacy, Jus-
tice Harlan, in his Katz concurrence, proposed that a two-part test be
applied: "[t]he question, however, is what proteconrit IffQrds to those
people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference
to a 'place.' My understanding of the rule that h#s emerged, from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 
"66
Following Katz, this two part subjective-objective test was adopted
by the Court in Smith v. Maryland. 67 In Smith, Justice Blackmun, recog-
nized the concurrence of Justice Harlan as the preferred standard.6"
"This inquiry. . . normally embraced two discrete questirns...
[W]hether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibied an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy'. . . [and] is... society prepared to recog-
nize [it] as reasonable."69 This is the threshold test 'which has been
applied to the majority of warrantless trash seardhe which' have been
challenged on constitutional grounds.7"
Prior to the Greenwood decision, the lower courts were divided as to
whether or not there was an expectation of privacy in garbage.7" The
majority of courts applying the reasonable expectation of privacy doc-
trine, however, held there is a lack of either a subjective or objective ex-
pectation of privacy.72 In addition to the dichotomy as to whether there
rights. The Katz decision marks the pinnacle of the Supreme Courtsefforts to.respond to the public
demand for increased privacy rights. In providing these rights to tho public, the Court has rejected
the entire body of Fourth Amendment law which centered around the trespass doctrine established
in Hester. Justice Black notes the majority's willingness to accommodate the public desires of the
radical 1960s in his dissent: "[I] do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the
meaning given them by today's decision, and... that it is the proper role of the Court to rewrite the
Amendments in order 'to bring it into harmony with the times' and thus reach a result that many
people believe to be desirable." Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 361.
67. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (defendant challenged the admissibility of phone
numbers which were logged in a telephone company log, based upon his expectation of privacy in
the numbers. The Court reasoned that although defendant may have hiad'a subjective expectation of
privacy in the numbers, society will not recognize this expectation of privacy as ieqonable).
68. Id. at 740.
69. Id.
70. Bush, supra note 51, at 286 ("a majority of the Court eventually adopted tie two-pronged
analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence when it decided Smith).
71. Note, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Abandonment, 1974 Wis. L tEv. 212 (1986)
(a thorough discussion of the various theories applied to garbage search and seizure cases).
72. See, eg., State v. Stevens, 123 Wis.2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1975); United States v. Crowell,
586 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
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was an expectation of privacy, many courts simply did not apply the
Katz standard to the analysis of warrantless trash searches.
In the post-Katz era, a number of federal and state courts deciding
the constitutionality of warrantless trash searches have avoided the use of
the objective-subjective analysis.73 Rather, these courts have applied an
array of theories, including: abandonment,74 consent, 75 and property
(curtilage) theories.76
Abandonment theory, although a consideration in determining one's
subjective expectation of privacy in property, has been routinely applied
in place of the Katz subjective-objective test.77 The theory is rooted in the
common law property standard. Hence, once property is abandoned it is
no longer eligible for constitutional protections. 78 Therefore, once the
garbage is placed upon the street, any constitutional privacy rights in it
are relinquished.79
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972)
(defendant has waived his rights of privacy in garbage which was been "abandoned' on the sidewalk
several houses away from his).
73. Bush, supra note 51, at 299-307.
74. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment In The Law of Search and Seizure: An Application of
Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 399 (1970) (demonstrates the regularity with which
courts have applied the strict abandonment theory as opposed to the Katz subjective-objective test).
See, eg., Mustone, 469 F.2d at 970; United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1971).
Many judges, as well as Mascolo have misinterpreted the test established in Katz. These legal analy-
ses using abandonment theories simply declare abandoned property outside the parameters of
Fourth Amendment protections prior to applying a subjective-objective analysis of the property. The
fact that the property in question appears abandoned should be a criterion in determining the de-
fendants subjective expectation of privacy, but not the sole criteria in determining whether Fourth
Amendment protections apply. The clear standard established in Katz should not be relegated insig-
nificant in the application of search and seizure law. See, e.g., Mascolo, supra note 74, at 411.
75. Purvis v. Wiseman, 298 F. Supp. 761 (Or. 1969) (when a maid searches the trash in a hotel
room, in the course of a consentual cleaning of defendants room, the evidence is obtain within the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment).
76. See, eg., United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 294 (8th Cir. 1971) (a trash can outside the
building, to be searched with a legal warrant is considered to be within the curtilage and therefore
within the scope of the warrant); United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273, 1276 (6th Cir. 1970) (the
carton and card which identified the location of a stolen television are not part of the curtilage when
placed outside on the curb for collection).
77. See supra note 82.
78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1959) (once a person checks out of a hotel, items left behind are considered abandoned and no
longer eligible for Fourth Amendment protections); Jackson v. State, 45 Ala. App. 621, 235 So.2d.
382 (Ala. 1970) (abandoned property is not subject to search and seizure protections); Moss v. Cox,
311 F. Supp. 1245 (Vir. 1970) (a discarded marijuana cigarette is considered abandoned property
and not subject to Fourth Amendment protections).
79. See cases cited supra note 82; United States v. Moone, 558 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
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An additional theory applied by lower courts is the consent the-
ory.8" Using the consent theory, once trash has been consentually surren-
dered to the trash collector, the collector has total discretion over the
trash.8" It has been strenuously argued that the consent theory is no
more than a reformation of the Hester property theory.8 2 The argument
is that by allowing implicit consent the courts are declaring that once the
garbage leaves the property the privacy rights cease. This is contrary to
the Katz declaration that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." 83
Despite the nullification of the Hester "curtilage theory" by the
Supreme Court in Katz, a minority of courts have still applied the curti-
lage theory to warrantless trash searches. Accordingly, garbage placed
outside the curtilage is not eligible for the protection of privacy provided
by the Fourth Amendment. 4  Although the Supreme Court has made
a clear attempt in Katz and Smith to provide a threshold test to deter-
mine the scope of Fourth Amendment privacy protections, there has
been little consistency in the lower court warrantless trash search and
seizure decisions.85 Perhaps the lack of a specific Supreme Couft Fourth
Amendment case dealing precisely with the scope of protection for gar-
bage had encouraged lower courts to apply the vast array of non-Katz
standards prior to Greenwood. The Greenwood decision will introduce a
clear standard for lower courts to follow.86 Unfortunately, this standard
sacrifices the societal objective expectation of privacy in an attempt to
establish a bright line rule.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF SOCIETY'S
OBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN GARBAGE
In Greenwood, Justice White declared, ". . . society would not accept
as reasonable respondents' claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left
for collection in an area accessible to the public... "87 Justice Brennan
80. Bush, supra note 51, at 305.
81. See, eg., Purvis, 298 F. Supp. at 763.
82. Bush, supra note 51, at 306. Implicit consent allows the police to draw property distinctions
based upon where they believe the individual would have allowed a consentual search to take place.
Such a theory does not measure the actual individual subject expectation of privace in the given area,
as the mere absence of the individual does not have any correlation to her actual expectation of
privacy.
83. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
84. See cases cited supra note 74.
85. See cases cited supra notes 74-76.
86. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35.
87. Id. at 41.
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declared, ".... society will be shocked to learn that the Court, the ulti-
mate grantor of liberty, deems unreasonable our expectation that the as-
pects of our private lives that are concealed safely in trash bags will not
become public."88 Ultimately, the central question in determining
whether the Katz test is applied correctly is, "in which areas of privacy
does society expect Fourth Amendment protections?"
The answer to this question is not easily ascertained as there are
many variables to be weighed in determining which areas of privacy our
society expects Fourth Amendment protection. In determining if society
expects a level of privacy in their garbage, it must first be demonstrated
what is randomly exposed in a garbage search. Then it must be deter-
mined whether society wishes to protect this information.
The examination of garbage by police exposes every aspect of an
individual's existence. When garbage is examined by police each piece of
garbage is scrutinized in detail. It is not possible for the officer to limit his
examination of the garbage to the illegal contraband. The search of gar-
bage, therefore, exposes each and every aspect of the individual's life to
the examiners. The same secrecies which our society has grown to expect
privacy in are now revealed to the examiner without any limitations, gui-
dance, or judicial scrutiny.
The Court has acknowledged that the refuse of our society will re-
veal many of the secrets of the individual's household. In his Greenwood
dissent, Justice Brennan observed:
A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and recrea-
tional habits of a person who produced it. A search of trash, like a search
of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual practices, health,
and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or intercepting
phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target's financial and
professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts,
personal relationships, and romantic interests.89
In fact, certain sociologists have found archaeological ethnography more
telling of an individual's life than a confidential survey. 90
The renowned archaeologist Emil Haury stated, "[i]f you want to
know what is really going on in a community, look at its garbage." 91
Haury has acted upon these words and undertaken a large garbage
88. Id. at 35, 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 50.
90. Rathje, Archaeological Ethnography: Because Sometimes Its Better to Give Than Receive,
EXPLORATIONS IN ETHNOARCHAELOGY 49 (R. Gould ed. 1978) (cited in Greenwood, 486 U.S. at
50).
91. Rathje, supra note 90, at 54.
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search operation, entitled "Project Garbage", in Tucson, Arizona. Pro-
ject Garbage has provided accurate demographic information of an en-
tire city,92 demonstrating that garbage surveillance can provide the
"social, economic, and moral concepts" of a community more accurately
than the interview survey. 93
Archaeologists commonly pick through the trash of ancient civiliza-
tions in piecing together the specifics of that civilization. From the trash
deposits of the civilization, details of religious beliefs, dietary habits, rec-
reational practices, sexual tendencies, and virtually every other aspect of
an ancient society can be ascertained from the survey of its refuse. 94 The
examination of the by-products of a society is a standard methodology in
most archaeological studies undertaken today. If the decomposed and
buried trash of an ancient civilization proves so telling to the trained
archaeologist, the unadulterated trash on the sidewalk has infinite poten-
tial in revealing the most intimate details of the individual's life to the
examiner.
From the nature and content of trash on the curb, every aspect of a
person's private life is revealed in a warrantless search of garbage.95 A
typical citizen of this country periodically disposes of personal corre-
spondences, bills, banking statements, articles telling of sexual conduct
and/or preferences, travel-entertainment plans, medical records and a
list of other items which reveal fundamental private concerns of the indi-
vidual. Items which are all disposed of in the expectation that they will
not become available to the public.
Furthermore, the individual has no choice but to dispose of refuse in
a timely manner. Common notions of sanitary, civilized behavior dictate
that an individual not allow refuse to accumulate in the home. Therefore,
the individual is compelled to dispose, in a timely fashion, the refuse that
contains the very secrets of the individual's lifestyle.
In addition to the desirable compulsions for disposing of refuse,
there is also a legal obligation to timely dispose of trash in a prescribed
manner. Many municipal and state laws govern the manner in which
personal refuse is handled. The refuse regulations are extremely diverse
and conflicting depending upon the community. 96 Nonetheless, a major-
ity of municipalities have passed regulations which govern the disposal of
92. Id. at 54-59.
93. Id. at 55.
94. Rathje, supra note 90, at 49-54.
95. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
96. Refuse Regulations Are Diverse and Conflicting, 6 REFUSE REMOVAL J. 26 (1963).
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refuse. These regulations have followed urbanization and are enacted pri-
marily for health and safety reasons.97
From a historical perspective the issue of privacy in garbage placed
upon the curb for collection was not an issue until the early to mid-twen-
tieth century. In the days prior to municipal health and safety regula-
tions, it was proper to dispose of refuse in two ways. First, anything
which was capable of burning was burned. Second, anything which was
not capable of being incinerated, was piled in the back yard and allowed
to decompose. 98 As a result, the individual's privacy rights in refuse were
protected quite well. Most refuse which revealed private aspects of one's
life went straight from the home into the burn-barrel.
However, as the urban setting developed these forms of waste dispo-
sal became unpleasant (particularly to the person living next to a com-
post pile), unsafe and unhealthy. Around the turn of the nineteenth
century cities began to regulate and provide for the removal of waste.99
At first these regulations were aimed at the disposition of "decayed vege-
table and animal matters."'" These regulations provided for, in many
instances, the removal of ashes from the burn-barrels."0 ' Therefore, a
majority of the secrecies of the individual were still burned prior to being
placed upon the street and were protected from public disclosure.
Around the 1940's and 1950's as the ability of the municipal govern-
ment to handle large quantities of refuse developed, and the fire, health
and safety of burning and mulching garbage also grew, more specific reg-
ulations regarding refuse disposal emerged. 102 The options of burning
97. With the advent of urbanization came numerous health and safety problems associated with
the removal of refuse. Local governments were forced to legislate solutions to these health and safety
problems. See THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PERFORM-
ANCE OF URBAN FUNCTIONS: LOCAL AND AREA WIDE 183-192 (1963).
98. Cleansing in Scunthorpe, 52 PUB. CLEANSING 509, 510-511 (1963) (a discussion of the
evolution of trash collection in a small English community). The same practices of early trash dispo-
sal was followed in the early twentieth century in the United States.
99. See, e.g., Buffalo, N.Y., ORDINANCES ch. 4, § 16 (1912) (Buffalo ordinance which specified
the manner in which household wastes are to be disposed).
100. Id. Section 16 provided precise regulations for the disposal of wastes. For example, "all
garbage or decayed vegetable or animal matter, such matter to be kept in tight, galvanized iron
cans .. " The Buffalo ordinance was not dissimilar to many of the municipal laws of the time.
101. See id.
102. The health and safety concerns raised by composts and burning prompted widespread local
legislation in the 1940's and 50's to govern refuse disposal. A random survey of the municipal ordi-
nances demonstrate the municipal desire to regulate waste disposal. See, e.g., Camilus, N.Y., CODE
art. 1, § 10-1 (1952) (local ordinance prohibiting any sort of dumping on any lot); Clifton Springs,
N.Y., CODE Ch. 7, § 7-1 (1948) (ordinance prohibiting disposition of "garbage or offensive matter"
on any place within the village).
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garbage or piling it in the back yard were eliminated by local legisla-
tion. "3 The citizens of these municipalities were afforded the privilege of
refuse pickup and management which is in place today. However, along
with the privilege of municipal waste disposal came an array of problems.
Among these problems are the entrusting of the information which can
be revealed in refuse, which have traditionally been protected by burning,
to the refuse collector; as well as, a growing problem of what to do with
the waste. Therefore, while the individual remains compelled by both
sanitary and legal motives to dispose of refuse in a timely and prescribed
manner, privacy is no longer certain because of the process of refuse
disposal.
In order to minimize the amount of public disclosure of the materi-
als which are contained in refuse, members of our society have employed
an array of techniques in the disposal of trash. All these trash disposal
techniques are aimed at minimizing the exposure of their personal trash
until it can be mixed into anonymity with the trash of others.
The most obvious manner in which the individual attempts to pro-
tect the contents of trash from public observation is, simply, by the
choice of refuse container. Inevitably, refuse is delivered to the curb in
either a trash can with a lid or an opaque garbage bag. The vast majority
of people, perhaps subconsciously, use these types of containers in trash
disposal. Each method affirms a widespread individual expectation of
some level of privacy in garbage.
When shopping for plastic garbage bags it is virtually impossible to
find transparent bags in the supermarket. Every major trash bag manu-
facturer has placed a pigmentation in the trash bag which makes the bag
black, green, brown, white, or some color which prevents the passage of
light, and thus prevents the disclosure of the contents of the bag. The
marketplace dictates that the consumer desire for opaque trash bags,
which hides the contents of the bag, is routinely fulfilled by the manufac-
turers of trash bags.
This same individual expectation of privacy on the part of the indi-
vidual is demonstrated when trash is taken to the curb in trash cans. A
trip to the local hardware store will demonstrate that most containers
manufactured for the express purpose of holding refuse on the curb come
with a lid. Of course the lid can serve other legitimate purposes, such as
pest control. However, when the lid is placed upon the can out on the
curb prior to pickup, it provides a measure of added security for the
103. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
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privacies which are under the lid. This again suggests an individual desire
for privacy in the contents of refuse.
The manner in which garbage is disposed by individuals, combined
with the short duration of time garbage actually is on the curb before
being mixed with the refuse of others, suggests that there is an individual
expectation of privacy in personal garbage placed upon the curb. In
Greenwood the individual subjective expectation of privacy is recognized.
At the same time, however, the societal subjective expectation of privacy
is rejected. 1°4
This type of dual test is fine when the privacy interest being chal-
lenged is a unique area of concern. That is, an area of concern where the
individual expectation is truly different than the reasonable societal ex-
pectation of privacy. However, as in the determination of the extent to
which privacy is expected in garbage, the widespread individual subjec-
tive expectation must have a correlation to the societal objective expecta-
tion of privacy. If the vast majority of individuals value a degree of
privacy in garbage, doesn't that indicate an objective expectation of pri-
vacy? At which point does subjective become objective?
It is suggested in legal commentary that this dual test in Katz allows
the courts to shape the interpretations of privacy expectations to fit their
policy objectives.105 It appears as though the court has manipulated the
societal expectation of privacy in Greenwood to fit their policy objectives.
If the test had been applied correctly, without the blinders of policy
objectives, the overwhelming societal desire for privacy would have been
observed. The methods of trash disposal across the nation indicates a
widespread subjective expectation in protecting the intimacies which are
revealed in the course of a warrantless trash search. This widespread sub-
jective expectation has crossed the foggy line into the objective expecta-
tion and should be viewed as a societal acceptance of an expectation of
privacy in refuse placed upon the curb for collection.
Our society has come to expect a great deal of privacy in the inti-
mate secrecies of our lives. There is little evidence to support the proposi-
tion that members of our society are willing to relinquish a degree of
privacy rights which have been established by the historical development
of the Constitution. Conversely, there is a growing public concern that
104. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43-44; State v. Trahan, 229 Neb. 683, 687, 428 N.W.2d 619, 622
(1988) (even though a subjective expectation of privacy exists, it is not reasonable unless society
accepts it as reasonable).
105. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
664 [Vol. 38
GREENWOOD
Orwell's 1984 level of surveillance is upon us.106 Furthermore, members
of our society are consistently concerned with the privacy interests of
citizens of other nations.107 In addition, there was a large public outcry
over the limitation on privacy as a result of Greenwood.'18 When viewing
current public opinions on privacy it is evident that our society still seeks
to preserve the tranquility which privacy under the Fourth Amendment
provides to certain areas of secrecy in our country. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that members of society will endorse the potential implications
of the Greenwood opinion.
The possibilities for police abuse of the privileges created in Green-
wood, and the creation of other inequities in privacy rights is extremely
likely. The decision allows police to pick up and sift through garbage at
will, without any judicial guidance or checks. By allowing police total
discretion in any surveillance procedure, it opens the door for potentially
widespread abuses. 09 The abuse of discretion in other areas of the law
where discretion has been granted is well documented.' 10 It is likely that
similar abuses of discretion will be incurred in the surveillance of garbage
by police. For example, police may be encouraged to organize systematic
refuse searches in high crime neighborhoods which expose the intimate
details of a person's life to the police, without the slightest suspicion of
wrongdoing.
In addition to possible abuses by police, the Greenwood decision will
encourage individual members of society to protect the intimacies, which
are revealed in garbage, through a variety of methods prior to disposing
of the refuse on the curb. It is likely that the use of paper shredders and
household incineration will become common practice. This shredder so-
ciety creates an array of further problems.
In this hypothetical shredder society, the privacy interests of those
106. Big Brother in the Office, 110 NEWSWEEK 78 (Oct. 1987); Big Brother Inc. May Be Closer
Than You Thought, 119 Bus. WEEK 84, 84-86 (1987). Recent developments in technologies have
brought the prospect of surveillance into the office and the work place. This erosion of privacy is
technologically possible and quite concerning to the public.
107. Members of our country are always advocating the individual rights of citizens of foreign
nations. See, eg., N. Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at A3 (Cambodia); N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A6
(El Salvador); N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1987, at A31 (Philippine Islands): N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1987,
at All (Nicaragua).
108. Legal Times, Aug. 29, 1988 (editorial opinion criticizing the holding in Greenwood, based
upon a perceived disregard of privacy rights by the Court).
109. See K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 143-163 (1975) (outlines problems with police discre-
tion); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 15-21 (1969); Williams, Po-
lice Discretion: The Institutional Dilemma-Who Is in Charge?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1983).
110. Williams, supra note 109 at 437.
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who can economically afford a shredder will be protected while the pri-
vacy interests of those in an inferior economic position will not be pro-
tected. In this shredder society the interests of the wealthy resident and
business institution will be protected from police observation while the
rest of the population has no option but to reveal the intimacies of their
lives to the unsupervised law enforcement community. At this point the
paramount sanctity of the private home is comparatively less than the
sanctity provided to the business and corporate setting.
The sanctity of the home is jeopardized when the protections of the
Fourth Amendment are not extended to privacy in one's garbage.
Clearly, evidence in garbage reveals the secrets of one's life which have
been traditionally protected by the Fourth Amendment. If the Katz stan-
dard were applied correctly in Greenwood, society would have affirmed
its objective expectation of privacy in these traditionally protected areas.
The majority of society, at least the society with which I am familiar, is
not willing to renounce their expectation of privacy in these areas and
allow the agents of the government to scrutinize their trash.
Reasoning that garbage is "readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public,"'111 the majority in
Greenwood declared that society is not prepared to accept an expectation
of privacy in garbage. Once the garbage hits the curb, it is exposed to
other elements of the world and the expectation of privacy no longer
exists in it.112
There are many faults in this line of reasoning. When the scope of
constitutional protections are being examined, it is well engraved in our
legal history that the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of the in-
dividual from agents of the government, not other nongovernmental ele-
ments of our society.' 13 The fact that other elements of our society may
scrutinize the privacies of our garbage does not automatically determine
that society has rejected its expectation of privacy in garbage. This type
of reasoning is no different than declaring that because a person's sanc-
tity in his home is violated by a burglar, the home owner has relinquished
an expectation of privacy in the home. This reasoning is illogical and
does not address the question whether society has waived its expectation
of privacy in garbage.
The courts have consistently struggled with illogical theories which
111. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
112. Id.
113. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1963) (the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect
the individual from all agents of the state). I
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attempt to reconcile societal expectations of privacy in garbage under the
Katz theory with ideological objectives which are determined to expand
the scope of police enforcement authority. Society, clearly, has an objec-
tive expectation in the privacy of garbage. Furthermore, the subjective
expectation of privacy in his trash was conceded by the Court in Green-
wood. If the Katz test was accurately applied in Greenwood, the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment would have been granted to refuse
placed upon the curb for collection.
V. A PROPOSAL TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE PROBABLE CAUSE
STANDARD IN TRASH SEARCHES
When the Court in Greenwood declared that society does not accept
a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage it exposed the privacies
contained in garbage of every member of our society. If the Court's ob-
jective was to balance the protections of the Fourth Amendment against
the enforcement authority of the police,114 the same results could have
been obtained via the application of a flexible application of the probable
cause standard. It would have been logical to adopt a flexible, sliding
scale standard of the "probable cause" requirement, as opposed to em-
ploying a misinterpretation of societal expectations of privacy. The appli-
cation of a flexible interpretation of the probable cause requirement has
been applied in the past when societal interests have prevailed over
Fourth Amendment protections.11 Why not adopt this flexibility when
deciding which areas should qualify for Fourth Amendment protections?
It is my proposition, that depending upon the area of concern, the
level of privacy expected by society varies. Traditionally, privacy in the
sanctity of the home has been tantamount.11 6 Protection of privacy of
one's own person has been traditionally highly valued in our society as
well. 7 The expectation of privacy in garbage is not equivalent to the
level of privacy which is expected in one's home, therefore, the need for
Fourth Amendment protection is not as great and a less stringent defini-
tion of probable cause should be applied. The judicial definition of prob-
able cause should be adjusted to reflect the level of privacy which is
expected in a particular area by members of our society.
114. Legal Times, Aug. 29, 1988 (police rights have been expanded at the cost of individual
Fourth Amendment protections).
115. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1 (the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment is circum-
vented in the interest of the public).
116. See supra notes ,8- 100 and accompanying text.
117. Terry, 392 U.S. at 2-4.
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Since the early 1960's the Court has been struggling with an appro-
priate definition of probable cause to provide protections from unreason-
able search and seizure, while not tying the hands of law enforcement
officials."I8 The more recent trend has been toward a flexible interpreta-
tion of probable cause.' 9
Early judicial opinions had a very stringent interpretation of prob-
able cause. 120 This stringent interpretation was affirmed in the leading
probable cause cases of the 1960's. In Aguilar v. Texas, 2' and Spinelli v.
United States,'22 the court established a two prong test which held the
law enforcement officials to a high standard of probable cause. This two
pronged test required that the knowledge be obtained in a trustworthy
fashion, and the veracity of the informant be reliable.'23
This high standard of probable cause proved troublesome as it al-
lowed no latitude in the coverage of the Fourth Amendment. This "all or
nothing" approach was first criticized by Professor Edward Barrett in
1960: "The result of this all or nothing approach is to place too little
restraint on some investigative techniques and too great [a] restraint on
others."' 2 4 Barrett called upon the court to adopt a standard of probable
cause with "reasonable latitude."' 25
The Court's willingness to interpret the probable cause standard as
flexible was first demonstrated in Terry v. Ohio.'"6 The Terry Court
demonstrated that the rigid interpretation of the probable cause require-
ment is not absolute.'27 In Terry a police officer observed two individuals
suspiciously casing a store. Without adequate probable cause, the police
officer stopped and frisked the two suspects. The Court declared that the
police officer must have a reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk an indi-
vidual, not the more strenuous probable cause requirement, as the desire
118. Note, The Two-Prong Aguilar-Spinelli Test Used in Probable Cause Determination is Aban-
doned in Favor of the Totality of Circumstance Approach Illinois v. Gates, 27 How. L.J. 1031, 1031-
1033 (1984) This article demonstrates the evolution of a flexible probable cause standard.
119. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
120. Hester, 265 U.S. at 57.
121. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (established a two-prong test for establishing prob-
able cause).
122. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1968) (further defined the prongs in the Aguilar
test).
123. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; Spinelli 398 U.S. at 417-418.
124. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SuP. CT. REv.
46, 59 (1960).
125. Id. at 58.
126. Terry, 392 U.S. at 3.
127. Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 120, 252 n.55 (1985).
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to minimize the dangers encountered in law enforcement outweighs the
individual need for protections from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 128
In recent years the Court has expanded upon the flexibility estab-
lished in Terry. This notion of a flexible probable cause standard is exem-
plified in Illinois v. Gates,129 which rejected the two propged Aguilar-
Spinelli test in favor of a totality of the circumstances standard. 130 In
Gates the Court ruled that hearsay of an anonymous informant, may be
used in establishing probable cause. The Court reasoned that all relevant
factors must be measured by the magistrate when determining whether
probable cause is established.13' The judicial acceptance of the totality of
the circumstances demonstrates the judicial trend toward a more flexible
interpretation of probable cause.1 32 The flexible interpretation of prob-
able cause is expanded in Post-Gates cases. 13 3 The judicial interpretation
that probable cause is no longer stringent, but a flexible concept, is well
established by these cases.
It is my contention that the flexibility which has been demonstrated
with the probable cause standard should be extended in deciding which
areas qualify for Fourth Amendment protections. A logical correlation
exists between the stringency of probable cause (level of protection) and
the expectation of privacy in a given area of concern. Why adopt an all or
nothing rule, similar to the old probable cause standard, when deciding
which areas qualify for Fourth Amendment protections? The Court
should adopt a flexible interpretation as to which areas qualify for
Fourth Amendment protections based upon the actual societal expecta-
tion of privacy.
This doctrine would recognize the fact that society expects a differ-
ent level of privacy in each specific area of concern. The standard of
probable cause should directly reflect the societal expectation of privacy
in a given area. This would provide a sliding scale of probable cause,
which would correlate to the divergent levels of societal expectation of
privacy in a given area. When the societal expectation of privacy is high
(as in the home) the standard for establishing probable cause should be
128. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
129. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (adopts totality of circumstances test for determining
probable cause).
130. Note, supra note 143, at 1031.
131. Gates, 462 U.S. at 217.
132. Note, Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court an
Court of Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 572 (1988).
133. See cases cited supra note 144.
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high. But as the expectation of privacy decreases (as in garbage on the
curb) the standard for establishing probable cause should be decreased.
This would provide the level of latitude which Barrett envisioned in the
Fourth Amendment, and provide privacy protections as society deems
appropriate.
When viewing the facts in the Greenwood case, it is immediately
apparent that there was a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.1 34 If
the sliding scale probable cause standard had been employed by the
Court, it would have been possible to recognize the societal expectation
of privacy in refuse placed upon the street for collection, while at the
same time providing law enforcement officials ample latitude in enforce-
ment. Furthermore, the diminished level of privacy expected in garbage
could be rationally demonstrated. Because the level of privacy is dimin-
ished, in refuse placed upon the curb, the level of evidence needed to
establish probable cause should be adjusted to accurately reflect the soci-
etal expectation of privacy. If this were the applicable doctrine, for de-
termining the level of probable cause, the police in Greenwood would
have been able to establish probable cause to conduct a warranted search
of the refuse. Therefore, providing judicial scrutiny of the police surveil-
lance techniques and protecting the privacies of other individuals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in California v. Greenwood, has manipulated
the Katz objective-subjective test in order to expand the authority of law
enforcement authorities at the expense of the protections provided by the
Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the Court has reached the illogical con-
clusion that society does not retain an expectation of privacy in the items
contained in refuse placed upon the curb for collection. Items which ulti-
mately reveal every aspect of a person's life are revealed in the course of a
warrantless trash search without any protections, or judicial scrutiny. By
ruling that there is no expectation of privacy in trash the Court has
opened the doors to potential police abuses, of their newly acquired dis-
cretion, at the expense of the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.
The equitable expansion of police enforcement authority could have
been accomplished while protecting individual privacy rights in garbage
as well. This could have been accomplished by first recognizing the socie-
tal expectation of privacy in refuse placed upon the curb for collection
and second, declaring that the level of protection expected in garbage is
134. See supra text accompanying notes 21-42.
[Vol. 3 8
GREENWOOD
diminished; therefore, the standard of probable cause should be reduced
to reflect this diminished expectation of privacy in refuse.
If this sliding scale of probable cause standard was accepted by the
Court, the level of protection would have been provided in conjunction
with the level of privacy expected by society. In the case at hand, it
would have been acknowledged that the level of privacy expected in re-
fuse is less than certain other areas, such as the home, and therefore the
probable cause standard would be reduced to reflect the diminished ob-
jective expectation of privacy. The facts in Greenwood clearly demon-
strate that the diminished probable cause standard would have been
established.
Serious thought should be given to the adoption of a flexible ap-
proach, such as a sliding scale standard of probable cause, as it would
eliminate the all or nothing interpretation of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions. This would provide a more equitable interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, and would establish protections from unreasonable search
and seizure in the areas where society truly desires such protections.
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